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Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press
Geoffrey R. Stone*
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, per-
haps both.'
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has investigated, threat-
ened to prosecute, and prosecuted public employees, journalists, and the
press for the dissemination of classified information relating to national
security. The government's response to the New York Times's revelation
of President George W. Bush's secret electronic surveillance directive illus-
trates the tension between the government and the press.
Senator Jim Bunning and Representative Peter King accused the Times
of "treason,"2 and 210 Republicans in the House of Representatives sup-
ported a resolution condemning the Times for potentially "plac[ing] the
lives of Americans in danger."3 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales went
so far as to suggest that the Times might be prosecuted for violating a provi-
sion of federal law making it a crime to disclose "information relating to
the national defense" with "reason to believe" that the information "could be
used to the injury of the United States." '4 In the entire history of the United
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
This Essay was written in collaboration with a project of the First Amendment Center and
was supported by the University of Chicago's Frank Cicero Fund. I would like to thank
Floyd Abrams, Scott Armstrong, Sandra Baron, Susan Buckley, Ronald Collins, Robert
Corn-Revere, Lucy Dalglish, Harold Edgar, Lee Levine, Paul McMasters, Jeffrey Smith,
Stephen Schulhofer, and Stephen Vladeck for their participation in a very insightful dis-
cussion of these issues at the First Amendment Center. For their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Essay, I am particularly grateful to Floyd Abrams, Harold Edgar, Louis
Fisher, Lee Levine, Robert Post, and Adam Samaha.
ILetter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
2 David Remnick, Nattering Nabobs, NEW YORKER, July 10, 2006, at 33, 34.
3 Rick Klein, House Votes to Condemn Media Over Terror Story, BOSTON GLOBE, June
30, 2006, at Al.
4 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2000). After the Times dis-
closed the NSA spy program, Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas suggested that he might pro-
pose legislation expressly making it unlawful for non-government employees to communi-
cate classified information. See Walter Pincus, Senator May Seek Tougher Law on Leaks,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, at A4. The government also threatened to prosecute individu-
als as a result of the Washington Post's disclosure of the government's secret detention camps
for enemy combatants in Eastern Europe. See Michael Barone, Blowback on the Press, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 8, 2006; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at AI. For a defense of the Bush administration's posi-
tion, see Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the New York Times Violated the Espionage Act?, COM-
MENT., Mar. 2006, at 23. The New York Times and the Washington Post both won the Pulit-
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States, the federal government has never prosecuted the press for publishing
confidential government information.
It is difficult to assess the precise cause of the current tension between
the government and the media. Perhaps the media are pressing more ag-
gressively than ever before to pierce the government's shield of secrecy.
Perhaps the government is pressing more aggressively than ever before to
expand its shield of secrecy. Perhaps both factors are at work. In this Es-
say, I explore not why this tension exists, but whether the measures taken
and suggested by the executive branch to prevent and punish the public dis-
closure of classified information are consistent with the First Amendment.'
I address three questions: (1) In what circumstances may the govern-
ment discharge and/or criminally punish a public employee for disclosing
classified information relating to the national security to a journalist for the
purpose of publication?6 (2) In what circumstances may the government
criminally punish the press for publishing such information? (3) In what
circumstances may the government criminally punish a journalist for re-
ceiving or soliciting such information from a government employee for
the purpose of publication? The issues are as difficult as they are impor-
tant, and the governing law is unformed and often obscure. I shall try to
bring some clarity to these questions,7 which in turn pose fundamental ques-
tions about the conflict between the government's authority to keep se-
crets, the press's responsibility to inform the public, and the government's
accountability to its citizens.
I. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
I begin with individuals who are not government employees. In what
circumstances may such persons be held legally accountable for revealing
zer Prize for journalism for publishing these stories.
5 For purposes of this Essay, I attempt to work within the principles and doctrines of
existing Supreme Court decisions. This is therefore more of a "lawyerly" than "academic"
analysis, although it inevitably reflects elements of both perspectives.
6 Although I refer throughout the Essay to "classified" information, the basic princi-
ples I discuss would apply to information that is confidential but not classified as well. The
fact of classification should be relevant to the analysis, but not dispositive of it. In other
words, some confidential but not classified information might be so central to national
security that the government has a sufficient reason to protect it from public disclosure.
There is also a problem when a journalist learns information orally, without receiving a
copy of the source document. In that situation, the journalist will not see the classification
on the document, which might lead to factual questions about the journalist's knowledge at
the time he received the information.
71 am not considering in this Essay a fourth issue related to this general set of ques-
tions: whether and to what extent the First Amendment protects a journalist's privilege. On
this question, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2005); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir.
2003); LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Caporale,
806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th
Cir. 1977); In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2004); Geof-
frey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal Reporter's Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 39 (2005).
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information to journalists for the purpose of publication? The answer to
this question will enable us to establish a baseline definition of First Amend-
ment rights. I will then inquire whether the rights of government employ-
ees are any different.'
A
In general, an individual who is not a government employee has a
broad First Amendment right to reveal information to a journalist for the
purpose of publication. There are a few limitations, however.
First, the Supreme Court has long recognized that there are "certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech," such as false state-
ments of fact, obscenity, and threats, that "are no essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."9 Because such categories of speech
have "low" First Amendment value, they may be restricted without satis-
fying the usual demands of the First Amendment. 0
For example, if X makes a knowingly false and defamatory statement
about Y to a journalist, with the understanding that the journalist will
publish that information, X might be liable to Y for the tort of defamation.
Or, if X reveals to a reporter that Y was raped, X might be liable to Y for
invasion of privacy. The public disclosure of Y's identity, unlike the fact
of the rape, might be thought to be of such slight value to public debate
that it can be prohibited in order to protect Y's privacy.1'
8 Although this Part focuses on government employees, a similar analysis would apply
to government contractors who are granted access to national security information. See Bd.
of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (holding that private contractors have
the same First Amendment rights as public employees); O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (same).
9 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
'
0 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (threats); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial advertising); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (false statements of fact); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957) (obscenity).
11 This is a more speculative example than defamation because the Supreme Court has
never upheld either a criminal prosecution or civil liability for invasion of privacy by pub-
lication. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (reversing the judgment that found
a newspaper civilly liable for publishing a rape victim's name that was publicly available);
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding that a newspaper cannot be
punished for publishing the name and photograph of a juvenile offender where the news-
paper had learned the suspect's name from several witnesses to the shooting and from the
police and prosecutors at the scene); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (holding that a reporter cannot be prohibited from disclosing the name of a juvenile
offender where the name was obtained at court proceedings that were open to the public);
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (ruling that a broadcaster cannot be held
liable in damages for publishing a rape victim's name where the name was lawfully ob-
tained by examining a copy of the indictment).
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Second, private individuals may sometimes voluntarily contract with
other private individuals to limit their speech. Violation of such a private
agreement is actionable as a breach of contract. For example, if X takes a
job as a salesman and agrees as a condition of employment not to disclose
his employer's customer list to competitors, he would be liable for breach
of contract if he revealed the list to a reporter for a trade journal with the
expectation that the journal would publish the list. Or, if Y accepts em-
ployment as a chemist and agrees not to disclose her company's trade
secrets, she would be liable if she revealed the information to a journal-
ist. In these circumstances, the individual has voluntarily agreed to limit
a First Amendment right. Such privately negotiated waivers of constitu-
tional rights are usually enforceable. 2
Third, there might be situations, however rare, in which an individ-
ual discloses previously non-public information to a journalist in circum-
stances when publication of the information would be so dangerous to
society that the individual might be punished for such disclosure. For exam-
ple, suppose a scientist discovers how to grow the ebola virus using ordi-
nary household materials. The harm caused by the public dissemination
of that information might be so clear, present, and grave that the scientist
could be punished for facilitating its publication.' 3
B
To what extent is a government employee in a similar position?
When we ask about the First Amendment rights of public employees, it is
the second of the three limitations examined above-the waiver of rights
issue-that is critical.
At first blush, it might seem that, whatever might be the case with
private employers, the government cannot insist that individuals surren-
der their First Amendment rights as a condition of public employment.
Surely, it would be unconstitutional, for example, for the government to
require individuals to agree as a condition of employment never to criticize
the President, practice Islam, or assert their Fourth Amendment rights. It
would be irrelevant that the individuals had voluntarily agreed not to
criticize the President, practice their faith, or assert their Fourth Amendment
rights, because the government cannot condition employment on the
waiver of constitutional rights. As the Supreme Court has long held, the
government cannot legitimately use its leverage over jobs, welfare benefits,
12 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that a confidential
source can sue a reporter for promissory estoppel for disclosing his identity in violation of
the reporter's promise not to do so).
13 A somewhat analogous situation was arguably presented in United States v. The Pro-
gressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), in which the court granted an injunction
against publication of an article allegedly providing information about how to make a nu-
clear bomb.
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drivers' licenses, tax deductions, zoning waivers, and the like to extract
waivers of constitutional rights.'
4
One could argue that because private employers can constitutionally
extract concessions from their employees as a condition of employment,
including waivers of constitutional rights, the government should be able
to do the same. There are three answers to this argument. First, the Con-
stitution binds only the government, not private employers. Second, the
government's scale and power are so vast that it can have a much more
pervasive impact on individual freedom than private employers can. Third,
because the government is not profit driven, it is much more likely than
private employers to sacrifice economic efficiency in order to achieve
other, especially political, goals. The government, for example, is much
more likely to refuse to hire people who do not support the party in
power, thus leveraging government power for political advantage. 5
This does not mean, however, that the government may never require
individuals to waive their constitutional rights as a condition of public
employment. There are at least two circumstances in which the govern-
ment may restrict the First Amendment rights of its employees. First, as
the Supreme Court noted in Pickering v. Board of Education, the gov-
ernment:
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its em-
ployees that differ significantly from those it possesses in con-
nection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the in-
terests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [govern-
ment], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees .... 16
"4 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[E]ven though a person
has no 'fight' to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny
him the benefit for any number of reasons," it may not do so "on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech.").
1' Professor Sunstein has put the point well:
Citizens may often find it in their interest to give up rights of free speech in ex-
change for benefits from government .... But if government is permitted to obtain
enforceable waivers, the aggregate effect may be considerable, and the delibera-
tive processes of the public will be skewed .... Waivers of first amendment fights
thus affect people other than government employees, and effects on third parties
are a classic reason to proscribe waivers. The analogy ... is to government pur-
chases of voting rights, which are impermissible even if voters willingly assent.
Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 915 (1986).
16 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
2007]
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The government has a legitimate interest in operating efficiently, and
some restrictions of employee speech might be reasonably necessary to
achieve that efficiency. The Hatch Act, for instance, prohibits public em-
ployees from taking an active part in political campaigns.17 Its goal is to
insulate public employees from undue political pressure and improper
influence. Thus, to enable public employees to perform their jobs properly,
the government may require them to waive the First Amendment right to
participate in partisan political activities. 8
Another illustration might involve a police officer who uses racist lan-
guage in a street encounter. The police department might reasonably con-
clude that the officer can no longer perform her job effectively or that her
continued employment would seriously undermine the department's credi-
bility with the community. As Pickering observed, it may be appropriate
in such circumstances to "balance" the competing interests. 19
Similarly, a government employee's disclosure of confidential informa-
tion to a journalist for the purpose of publication might jeopardize the
government's ability to function effectively. For example, if an IRS em-
ployee gives a reporter someone's confidential tax records, this disclosure
might seriously impair the public's confidence in the tax system.
A second reason why the government may sometimes restrict what
otherwise would be the First Amendment rights of public employees is
that the employee learns the information only by virtue of his government
employment. Arguably, it is one thing for the government to prohibit its
employees from speaking in ways in which other citizens can speak, but
something else entirely for it to prohibit them from speaking in ways
other citizens cannot speak. If a public employee gains access to confiden-
tial information only because of his public employment, then prohibiting
him from disclosing that information to anyone outside the government
might be said not to restrict his First Amendment rights at all because he
had no right to know the information in the first place.20 The presence of
this factor would seem to add weight to the government's side of the Picker-
ing balancing.
There is little clear law on this question. In Snepp v. United States,2
however, the Supreme Court held that a former employee of the CIA could
constitutionally be held to his agreement not to publish "any information
or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities
generally, either during or after the term of [his] employment, [without]
17 5 U.S.C.A. § 7324 (2001).
1S See, e.g., U.S. Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
'9391 U.S. at 568.
20 See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (upholding a protective
order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing confidential information it obtained only
"by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes"); see also Robert C. Post, The Management
of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 169.
21 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
[Vol. 1
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specific prior approval by the Agency." 22 The Court did not suggest that
every government employee can be required to abide by such a rule. Rather,
it emphasized that a "former intelligence agent's publication of ... mate-
rial relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national
interests.
23
In light of Pickering and Snepp, it seems reasonable to assume that a
public employee who discloses classified information relating to the na-
tional security to a journalist for the purpose of publication has violated his
position of trust and ordinarily may be discharged and/or criminally pun-
ished without violating the First Amendment.
It is important to note that this conclusion is specific to public em-
ployees and does not govern those who are not public employees. Unlike
public employees, who have agreed to abide by constitutionally permis-
sible restrictions of their speech, journalists and publishers have not agreed
to waive their rights. This situation is analogous to one where the private
employee agrees not to disclose his employer's customer lists, but does
so. Although the employee might be liable for breach of contract, the jour-
nalist to whom he discloses the list and the trade journal that publishes it
are not liable to the employer. 24
Moreover, as the Court recognized in Pickering, the government has
a greater (though not unlimited) need for, and interest in, restricting the
speech of its employees than restricting the speech of individuals gener-
ally. The government cannot constitutionally punish individuals for mak-
ing racist comments, but it can discipline a police officer who makes such
comments on the job.
Information the government wants to keep secret may be of great
value to the public. The public disclosure of an individual's tax return may
undermine the public's confidence in the tax system, but it may also re-
veal important information about a political candidate's finances. The
conclusion that the government has a legitimate reason to prohibit its em-
ployees from disclosing such information does not reflect a judgment that
the government's interest in confidentiality outweighs the public's inter-
est in disclosure. Indeed, information about a political candidate's finances
22 id. at 508.
23 Id. at 511-12; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding the Secretary
of State's revocation of a former CIA employee's passport for exposing the identities of
covert CIA agents).
24 See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding that
the government may not punish the press for publishing confidential information, even
though it may prohibit public employees from disclosing that information); Neb. Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding that the government may not restrain the
press from publishing information about a criminal defendant, even though it may prohibit
public employees from disclosing such information to the press); see also Gentile v. State
Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (ruling that the extrajudicial "speech of lawyers repre-
senting clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than
that established for regulation of the press," because lawyers are voluntary participants in
the legal system).
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might be of fundamental significance to public debate. It would plainly
be unconstitutional for the government to prohibit the dissemination of
such information if it did not come from the government's own files.
In theory, of course, it would be possible for the courts to decide in
each instance whether an unauthorized disclosure of confidential infor-
mation by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment because
the value of the information to the public outweighs the government's
need for secrecy. But such an approach would put the courts in an extremely
awkward position and effectively would convert the First Amendment into a
constitutional Freedom of Information Act. The Supreme Court has sen-
sibly eschewed that approach and granted the government considerable
deference in deciding whether and when public employees may disclose
confidential government information. 25
C
Such disclosures are not always punishable, however. In applying
Pickering and Snepp, courts do not give the government carte blanche to
insist on secrecy. The government's restrictions must be reasonable.
Returning to the problem of confidential information relating to the
national security, I begin with classified information. The existing classifica-
tion system authorizes public employees to classify any information the
unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to harm
national security. Access to such information is restricted to individuals with
an appropriate security clearance. It is unlawful for a government employee
to disclose such information to any person who is not authorized to know
it.2
6
The classification system is a highly imperfect guide to the need for
confidentiality. The concept of "reasonable expectation of harm to na-
tional security" is inherently vague and amorphous. It is impossible to
know from this standard how likely, imminent, or grave the potential harm
must actually be. Moreover, the classification process is poorly designed
and sloppily implemented. Predictably, the government tends to over-
classify information. An employee charged with the task of classifying
25 For an excellent critique of this conclusion, see Adam M. Samaha, Government State
Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
909, 948-76 (2006), which suggests that the Freedom of Information Act can provide a
useful "platform" for recognizing and enforcing a broader constitutional right of access to
government secrets.26 See Executive Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), amending
Executive Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995). There are three designa-
tions. "Top Secret" refers to information the unauthorized disclosure of which could rea-
sonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security. "Secret"
refers to information the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
cause serious damage to national security. "Confidential" applies to information the au-
thorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national
security. See id. at 15,326.
[Vol. I
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information inevitably will err on the side of over-classification because
no employee wants to be responsible for under-classification. In addition,
we know from experience that public officials have often abused the
classification system to hide from public scrutiny their own misjudgments,
incompetence, or venality.
27
Despite these very real concerns with the classification system, there
is good reason to have clear, simple, and easily administered rules to guide
public employees. Hence, a government employee ordinarily can be dis-
ciplined, discharged, or prosecuted for knowingly disclosing classified
information to a journalist for the purpose of publication.28
D
Are there any circumstances in which a public employee has a First
Amendment right to disclose classified information to a journalist for the
purpose of publication? Courts have recognized that a public employee
has such a right if the government fails to satisfy two conditions. In order
to punish the public employee, the government first must prove that the
disclosure would be "potentially damaging to the United States. '29 Al-
though this judgment is implicit in the very fact of classification, that alone
is not conclusive. Because the classification process is imperfect, the
courts require independent proof of at least potential harm to the national
security.
Second, the government must prove that the information was "closely
held" and "not available to the general public" prior to the employee's
27 See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson,
J., concurring) ("There exists a tendency, even in a constitutional democracy, for govern-
ment to withhold reports of disquieting developments and to manage news in a fashion
most favorable to itself."); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1204 n.77 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (noting "the well-documented practice of classifying as confidential much relatively
innocuous or noncritical information"); see also Harold Edgar & Benno Schmidt, Jr., Cur-
tiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 349, 354 (1986) ("[The E]xecutive is inherently self-interested in expanding
the scope of matters deemed 'secret'; the more that is secret, the more that falls under
executive control."). By the mid-1990s, 1,336 government employees were authorized to
classify information "Top Secret," and more than two million public employees and one
million government contractors had "derivative classification" authority. See REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY xxxix, Sen.
Doc. 105-2, 103d Cong. (1997) (Chairman's Foreword).
28 What if a public employee discloses information relating to national security that is
not classified? One approach would be to hold that non-classification is dispositive. But
this would not work when the disclosed information is not in a tangible form and therefore
cannot be marked as "classified." An alternative approach is to allow the government to
punish the disclosure if the employee knew both that the government regarded the informa-
tion as confidential and that the unauthorized disclosure of the information could be ex-
pected to cause damage to national security. See United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05CR225,
2006 WL 2345914 (E.D. Va., Aug. 9, 2006).
29 See, e.g., Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-72; Rosen, 2006 WL 2345914.
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disclosure.3" As Judge Learned Hand noted more than sixty years ago, "it
is obviously lawful" for a public employee to reveal information that the
government has not withheld from the public.3
Thus, to punish a public employee for disclosing classified informa-
tion to a reporter for the purpose of publication, the government must prove
that the information was not already in the public domain and that the
disclosure is potentially damaging to the national security.
This is a far cry from requiring the government to prove that the em-
ployee knew the disclosure would create a clear and present danger of grave
harm to the nation. The gap between these two standards represents the
difference between the rights of ordinary individuals and the rights of public
employees. It is what the public employee surrenders as a condition of
his employment; it is the effect of Pickering balancing; and it is a meas-
ure of the deference we grant the government in the management of its "in-
ternal" affairs.32
Under this approach, erroneous classification of a particular document
is not a sufficient justification for a public employee's breach of his con-
tract with the government. A public employee does not have a First
Amendment right to second-guess the classification system. As long as
the conditions of potential harm and secrecy are satisfied, the employee
has no constitutional right to disclose classified information and then as-
sert in his defense that the information was insufficiently dangerous or
too valuable to public debate to justify secrecy. A central goal of the classifi-
cation system is to avoid these ad hoc judgments, and courts generally
should not be in the business of second-guessing the classifiers.33
This approach is fundamentally problematic. As we have seen, the
disclosure of confidential information may be both potentially harmful to
the national security and quite valuable to public debate. Consider, for ex-
ample, information relating to (a) secret understandings with other na-
tions, (b) evaluations of new weapons systems, (c) plans for shooting down
hijacked airplanes, and (d) evaluations of the adequacy of private indus-
try's protection of nuclear power plants. One might reasonably conclude
that some or all of this information should be available to the public to
3 0 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-72; Rosen, 2006 WL 2345914 at *23-*24; see also
United States v. Truong Din Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 918 n.9 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 627-28 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990).
a' United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
32 For examples of cases dealing with public employees in the context of classified in-
formation, see Morison, 844 F.2d 1057; United States v. Zettl, 835 F2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
13 This is similar to the tax return situation. An IRS employee does not have a constitu-
tional right to leak an otherwise confidential tax return because the confidentiality of that
return is not sufficiently "important" to warrant confidentiality.
[Vol. I
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enable informed deliberation. But the approach to public employees out-
lined above empowers the government to forbid its disclosure.
In this sense, granting a high level of deference to the government to
determine what information to withhold from the public significantly over-
protects government secrecy at the expense of official accountability and
informed public debate. There is no reason to believe that government offi-
cers will reach the "right" result in striking the balance between national
security and the public's right to know. Not only do they have powerful
incentives to over-classify, but the classification standard itself considers
only one side of the balance-whether disclosure might harm the national
security. It does not even take into account the other side of the bal-
ance-whether disclosure might enhance democratic governance.
The law as it stands accepts this approach largely for the sake of
simplicity, but we should be under no illusions about the impact. This stan-
dard gives inordinate weight to secrecy at the expense of informed public
opinion.
E
There is at least one situation, however, in which a government em-
ployee must have a First Amendment right to disclose classified informa-
tion, even if the disclosure might harm the national security. This arises
when the disclosure reveals unlawful government conduct.
Applying the Pickering standard, the government has no legitimate
interest in keeping secret its own illegality, and the public has a compel-
ling interest in the disclosure of such information. Even if the government
ordinarily can punish a public employee for disclosing classified informa-
tion, that presumption disappears when the disclosure reveals the govern-
ment's own wrongdoing. The government is, after all, accountable to the
public. In a self-governing society, citizens need to know when their rep-
resentatives violate the law.34
Even in this situation, however, the government might argue that public
employees should never disclose classified information. After all, even a
well-intentioned "whistleblower" might be wrong in his assessment of a
program's legality, and by disclosing the information he might seriously
damage the national security. The government might maintain that, at
least in dealing with classified information, government employees must
err on the side of protecting the national security and that such leakers
must be punished even if the program is unlawful. Only in this way, the
government might argue, can it effectively deter future leakers from tak-
ing chances with the national security.
14 Indeed, federal law forbids classification for the purpose of concealing "violations
of law, inefficiency, or administrative error." Executive Order No. 13,292, § 1.7(a)(i), 68
Fed. Reg. 15,318 (Mar. 25, 2003).
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From a constitutional perspective, this is unexplored terrain. In my
judgment, the government employee must prevail on this issue. In terms
of deterrence, it should suffice for the government to punish those who
disclose classified programs that are not unlawful. When the program is
in fact unlawful, the public's need to know outweighs the government's
interest in secrecy. As we have seen, public employees cannot be pun-
ished for disclosing classified information that is already public or whose
disclosure does not pose a threat to the national security. Public employ-
ees who disclose government illegality should have similar protection.3"
An intermediate position would allow the government to punish pub-
lic employees who disclose unlawful programs if (a) the employee knew
that the government regarded the program's secrecy as critical to the na-
tional security, and (b) there were reasonable procedures in place through
which the employee could have questioned the legality of the program,
without going to the press, and he failed to use those procedures.36 If such
procedures exist and the government employee complies with them, he
should not be punished for then disclosing an unlawful program.
A related question is whether a public employee can be punished for
disclosing a classified program she reasonably but wrongly believed to be
unlawful. A familiar analogy resolves this problem. If an individual rea-
sonably believes that a criminal law restricting speech violates the First
Amendment, she may violate the law and raise the constitutional issue as
a defense. If she was right in believing the law unconstitutional, she can-
not be punished. But if she was wrong, she can be convicted, because the
First Amendment does not recognize as a defense the defendant's reason-
able belief that the law was invalid. This same principle should apply to
public employees who disclose classified information.
To summarize, a public employee who knowingly discloses classified
information to a journalist for the purpose of publication may be disci-
plined, discharged, and/or criminally punished if the information was not
already in the public domain and its disclosure has the potential to harm
the national security, unless the disclosure reveals unlawful government
31 In some instances, the legality of the government's conduct will be unclear. It will
need to be resolved in the course of the criminal prosecution or the civil action arising out
of the employee's discharge. A more difficult question than illegality is whether the em-
ployee has a First Amendment right to expose waste, incompetence, or deceit, as where a
public official lies to the public. I am inclined to privilege such disclosures, as well as
those involving illegality.
36 The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 sets forth a lim-
ited mechanism to enable whistleblowers dealing with classified information to raise their
concerns with agency officials or members of congressional oversight committees. The Act
covers whistleblowers who want to report (1) a serious abuse or violation of law; (2) a
false statement to, or willful withholding of information from, Congress; or (3) a reprisal
in response to an employee's reporting of an urgent matter. Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 702,
112 Stat. 2413, 2415 (1998).
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action and the employee has complied with reasonable whistleblower
procedures governing the disclosure of such information.
3 7
II. THE PRESS
In what circumstances may the government criminally punish the
press for publishing classified information? In the entire history of the
United States, the government has never prosecuted the press for such
action. Of course, this does not mean such a prosecution is impossible. It
may be that the press has exercised great restraint and has never before
published confidential information in circumstances in which a prosecu-
tion would be constitutionally permissible. Or, it may be that the govern-
ment has exercised great restraint and has never prosecuted the press
even though that would have been constitutionally permissible. We can-
not know the answer until we define the circumstances in which such a
prosecution would be consistent with the First Amendment.38
A
Because there has never been such a prosecution, the Supreme Court
has never had an occasion to rule on such a case. The closest it has come
was in New York Times v. United States,39 the "Pentagon Papers" case.
In 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara commissioned a
top secret study of the Vietnam War. The study, which filled forty-seven
volumes, reviewed in great detail the formulation of U.S. policy toward
Indochina, including military operations and secret diplomatic negotia-
tions. In the spring of 1970, Daniel Ellsberg, a former Defense Department
official, gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. On
June 13, the Times began publishing excerpts from the Papers. The next
31 On August 2, 2006, Senator Christopher "Kit" Bond introduced legislation to clarify
the circumstances in which public employees or others who are officially entrusted with
access to classified information may be criminally prosecuted for unauthorized disclosure
of such information. The proposed legislation would make it unlawful for such persons
knowingly to disclose classified information to any person who is not authorized to receive
it. The proposal defines "classified information" as information or material that has been
"properly classified." This law would clearly apply to disclosures to members of the press.
Whether this law would be constitutional depends on the interpretation of "properly
classified." The proposal would, in my view, be constitutional if "properly classified" is
construed as excluding the classification of information already in the public domain, in-
formation whose disclosure does not have the potential to harm national security, and in-
formation that reveals unlawful government action. Congress enacted similar legislation in
2000, but President Bill Clinton vetoed it as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
See Bond Legislation Targets Intelligence Leaks (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/news/2006/08/bond080206.html.
31 Perhaps the closest the government ever came to a prosecution of the press involved
a disclosure by the Chicago Tribune in 1942 that might have alerted the Japanese to the
fact that the United States had broken their secret codes. See GEORGE LENDT, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE: THE RISE OF A GREAT AMERICAN NEWSPAPER 627-36 (1979).
39403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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day, Attorney General John Mitchell sent a telegram to the Times stating
that the publication of this material was "prohibited" by federal law and
that further publication would "cause irreparable injury to the defense
interests of the United States."' He therefore requested that the Times
"publish no further information of this character and advise" him that it
had "made arrangements for the return of these documents to the Depart-
ment of Defense."'
'a
Two hours later, the Times transmitted a response, which it released
publicly: "The Times must respectfully decline the request of the Attor-
ney General, believing that it is in the interest of the people of this coun-
try to be informed of the material contained in this series of articles.
42
The Times added that, if the government sought to enjoin any further publi-
cation of the material, it would contest the government's position, but would
"abide by the final decision of the court. ' 43
Events escalated quickly. On June 15, the United States filed a com-
plaint for injunction against the Times. The federal district court promptly
granted the government's request for a temporary restraining order on the
ground that "any temporary harm that may result from not publishing
during the pendency of the application for a preliminary injunction is far
outweighed by the irreparable harm that could be done to the interests of
the United States Government if it should ultimately prevail" in the case. 44
This was the first time in U.S. history that a federal judge had restrained
a newspaper from publishing information relevant to public debate.
Over the next few days, the matter rapidly worked its way up to the
Supreme Court. On June 30, the Court announced its decision. Reflecting
the unprecedented nature of the case, each Justice wrote an opinion. Six
Justices held that the government had not met its "heavy burden of show-
ing justification" for a prior restraint on the press. 45 The Court therefore
ruled that the Times was free to resume publication of the Pentagon Papers.
Justice Potter Stewart's opinion best captures the view of the Court:
"We are asked ... to prevent the publication ... of material that the Ex-
ecutive Branch insists should not, in the national interest, be published. I
am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the
documents involved. But I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation
or its people."46
40 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 504 (2004).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
46 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). The government filed criminal charges against
Ellsberg for leaking the Pentagon Papers, but the prosecution was abandoned as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct. See Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech:
The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974).
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B
A fundamental question posed by the Pentagon Papers controversy is
who should decide whether classified information should be made public.
In the first instance, it would seem that our elected officials, who are
charged with the responsibility of protecting the national security, must
have the authority to decide such matters. But we know that these officials
may sometimes have mixed motives for keeping secrets. They may be
concerned not only with protecting the national security, but also with cover-
ing up their own mistakes, misjudgments, and wrongdoings. To give them
the final say would risk depriving the American people of critical infor-
mation about the conduct of their elected officials.
In the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court held that although
elected officials have broad authority to keep classified information secret,
once that information gets into the hands of the press, the government
has only very limited authority to prevent its further dissemination. This
may seem an awkward, even incoherent, state of affairs. If the govern-
ment can constitutionally prohibit public employees from disclosing classi-
fied information to the press in the first place, why can it not enjoin the press
from publishing that information if a government employee unlawfully
discloses it?
But one could just as easily flip the question. If the press has a First
Amendment right to publish classified information unless publication
will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people," why should the government be allowed to prohibit
its employees from revealing such information to the press merely because
it poses a potential danger to the national security? If we view the issue
from the perspective of either the public's right to know or the govern-
ment's interest in secrecy, it would seem logical that the same rule should
apply to both public employees and the press. The very different standards
governing public employees, on the one hand, and the press, on the other,
present a puzzle.
However, there are good reasons for this state of affairs. As we have
seen, the government has broad authority to prohibit public employees
from disclosing classified information to the press. This rule is based not
on a careful balancing of the government's need for secrecy and the pub-
lic's need for information, but on a combination of the employee's consent
to this limitation on his freedoms and the government's reasonable desire
for a clear, easily administrable rule for public employees. For the sake
of efficiency and simplicity, the law governing public employees substan-
tially overprotects the government's legitimate interest in secrecy. But the
employee's consent and the need for a simple rule have nothing to do with
the rights of the press or the needs of the public. Under ordinary First
Amendment standards, the press has broad freedom to publish informa-
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tion of value to public debate unless, at the very least, the government can
prove that the publication poses a clear and present danger of serious harm.47
As Yale constitutional scholar Alexander Bickel once observed, this
may seem a "disorderly situation.4 8 But it works. If we grant the govern-
ment too much power to punish the press, we risk too great a sacrifice of
public deliberation; if we give the government too little power to control
confidentiality "at the source," we risk too great a sacrifice of secrecy.49 The
solution, which has stood us in good stead for more than two centuries, is
to reconcile the conflicting values of secrecy and accountability by guar-
anteeing both a strong authority of the government to prohibit leaks and
an expansive right of the press to publish them.5" This solution may seem
awkward in theory and unruly in practice, but it has withstood the test of
time.5
41 See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (requiring not only
clear and present danger, but also that the magnitude of the danger be serious); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that even express advocacy of unlawful
conduct can be proscribed only if the advocacy "is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (same); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941) (noting that in order to punish expression, "the substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high"); see also Kent Greenawalt, "Clear
and Present Danger" and Criminal Speech, in LEE C. BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R. STONE,
ETERNALLY VIGILANT 119 (2002) (noting that to punish speech, the evil must be imminent,
likely, and grave); Bernard Schwartz, Holmes v. Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advo-
cacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 209, 240-41 ("[T]he immediate law viola-
tion must be likely to occur.").
48 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975).
49 Id. at 79-82.
50 This approach is not unique to the national security context. The Court has applied it
to a broad range of issues involving the publication of confidential government informa-
tion. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (publication of rape victim's
name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (publication of the name of a
juvenile offender); Landmark Commc'ns, 435 U.S. 829 (publication of confidential matters
before judicial review board); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977)
(publishing the name of a juvenile offender); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976) (publication of information about criminal defendant before trial); Cox Broad. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (publication of rape victim's name). In all these decisions, the
Court invoked the principle that although the government could prohibit public employees
from disclosing the information in the first place, it could not thereafter enjoin or punish
the media for further disseminating the information once it fell into the public domain.
51 A slightly different variant of this doctrine involves not unlawful disclosures by pub-
lic employees, but some other underlying illegality. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001), for example, Vopper, a radio talk show host, was prosecuted for broadcasting a re-
cording of a private telephone conversation. The recording had been made by a third per-
son in violation of the federal law and was sent to Vopper. Although the recording was
unlawful, the Court held that Vopper could not constitutionally be held liable for damages
for broadcasting it. The only decision in which the Supreme Court has held that a publisher
could be punished for distributing speech because the speech was produced or made avail-
able to the press as a result of an unlawful act involved child pornography. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). But the child pornography issue is readily distinguishable
from all other situations, including the disclosure of classified information by public em-
ployees, because the images presented in child pornography can easily be generated with-
out engaging in actual child sexual abuse. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234
(2002) (holding that government cannot punish the exhibition of images of children en-
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C
Three questions remain: (1) Does the same constitutional standard gov-
ern criminal prosecutions and prior restraints? (2) What disclosures might
satisfy the Pentagon Papers standard? (3) What about information that
satisfies the Pentagon Papers standard and contributes to public debate?
In the Pentagon Papers case, the Court emphasized that it was dealing
with a prior restraint, a type of speech restriction that bears a particularly
"heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."52 This raises the
question whether the test stated in Pentagon Papers governs criminal prose-
cutions as well as prior restraints. The inquiry is important because Jus-
tices White and Stewart intimated in Pentagon Papers that this was an
open question.53
The concept of prior restraint is deeply embedded in the history of
the First Amendment. Historically, censorship took the form of licensing.
No one could publish without first obtaining a license from the government.
Anyone who published without one could be punished, even if he could
prove that he would have been issued a license. The failure to comply with
the system was itself a crime.
Injunctions operate in much the same way. If a publication is enjoined,
and a publisher violates the injunction, he can be punished for violating
it even if the injunction was improperly granted. In this sense, licensing
requirements and injunctions are different from ordinary criminal laws. A
speaker who is prosecuted for violating a criminal law can assert the de-
fense that the law is unconstitutional. Licensing schemes and injunctions,
on the other hand, cannot be challenged in this manner. They are ordinar-
ily governed by the "collateral bar rule," which provides that they can be
challenged only by appealing the issuance of the injunction or the denial
of the license. As a consequence, injunctions and licensing requirements
are arguably more likely than criminal statutes to induce compliance with
their terms, at least for the time it takes to appeal.'
On the other hand, the penalties for violating a licensing requirement
or an injunction are usually much less severe than those for violating a
criminal law, and a system of prior restraint actually enables the speaker to
know in advance whether his speech is subject to punishment. As a con-
sequence, the logic of the prior restraint doctrine has often been ques-
tioned. As Harvard law professor Paul Freund observed more than fifty
gaged in sex if they are produced by computer simulation or the use of body double rather
than by actual child sexual abuses). In the classified information situation, the information
made available to the public would not exist but for the underlying unlawful disclosure.
52 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
13 See id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 737 (White, J., concurring).
' See Stephen Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539, 551-53
(1977).
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years ago, "it will hardly do to place 'prior restraint' in a special category
for condemnation. 55
Whatever one thinks of the prior restraint doctrine, its primary sig-
nificance involves issues like obscenity and libel. When the government
regulates low value speech, it ordinarily may do so on the basis of a rela-
tively undemanding standard. In that setting, the prior restraint doctrine
has real bite.5 6 But in dealing with expression that lies at the very heart of
the First Amendment-speech about the conduct of govemment-the dis-
tinction between prior restraint and criminal prosecution carries much
less weight.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the government ordinarily
may not criminally punish speech about public affairs because of its con-
tent unless, at the very least, it creates a clear and present danger of seri-
ous harm. Although the precise words may differ from one case to an-
other, the basic elements of the test are the same. Thus, as a practical matter,
the standard used in Pentagon Papers is essentially the same as the stan-
dard the Court would use in a criminal prosecution of the press for pub-
lishing information about the activities of the government.57 Indeed, in
the thirty-five years since Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court has not once
upheld a content-based criminal prosecution of truthful speech relating to
the activities of the government that did not involve some special circum-
stance, such as public employment. That, in itself, speaks volumes. I con-
clude that the test articulated in Pentagon Papers is essentially the stan-
dard the Court would have applied in a criminal prosecution of the Times
for publishing the Pentagon Papers. And even if that was not obvious in
1971, it is certainly clear today.5
What is an example of information the publication of which could be
criminally punished? The traditional example was "the sailing dates of
transports" or the "location of troops" in wartime.59 In some circumstances,
the publication of such information could instantly alert the enemy and
endanger American lives. There might be little the government could do
" Paul Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539
(1951); see also Stephen Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, supra note 54; Vincent
Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. II
(1981); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of
Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 245 (1982); Martin Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine
in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).56 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (obscenity); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (libel).
7 See David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in
BOLLINGER & STONE, ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 47, at 58 ("[I]t is difficult to be-
lieve that the Court would have allowed newspaper editors to be punished, criminally, after
they published the [Pentagon] Papers.").
58See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Worrell
Newspapers v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
59 Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (1931).
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to protect our sailors and soldiers from attack. Other examples might in-
clude disclosure of the identities of covert CIA operatives 6° or disclosure
that the government has secretly broken the enemy's code, thus alerting
the enemy to change its cipher. In such situations, the harm from publica-
tion might be thought sufficiently likely, imminent, and serious to justify
punishing the disclosure.
An important feature of these illustrations often passes unnoticed:
what makes these examples so compelling is not only the nature and magni-
tude of the harm, but also the implicit assumption that the information does
not meaningfully contribute to public debate. In most circumstances, there is
no apparent value in having the public know the secret "sailing dates of
transports" or "location of troops" when there is no time for political ac-
tion. Later, of course, such information may be critical in evaluating the
effectiveness of our military leaders, but at the very moment the troops
are set to attack it is unclear how publication of their location could
meaningfully contribute to public discourse. The same may be said about
disclosing publicly that the U.S. government has broken an enemy's code.
My point is not that these illustrations involve "low" value speech in the
conventional sense of that term, but that they involve information that does
not seem particularly "newsworthy" and that this factor plays a significant
role in making the illustrations persuasive.
The failure to notice this feature of these examples can lead to a se-
rious failure in analysis. Indeed, just such a failure was implicit in the
memorable hypothetical Justice Holmes first used to elucidate the clear
and present danger test-the false cry of fire in a crowded theatre. 61 Why
can the false cry of fire be restricted? Because it creates a clear and pre-
sent danger of a mad dash to the exits. Therefore, Holmes reasoned, the
test for restricting speech is whether it creates a clear and present danger
of serious harm. But the reasoning is spurious. Suppose the cry of fire is
true. In that case, we would not punish the speech-even though it still
would cause a mad dash to the exits-because the value of the speech
would outweigh the harm it would create. Thus, at least two factors must
be considered in analyzing this situation-the harm caused by the speech
and the value of the speech.
Similarly, the reason for protecting the publication of the Pentagon
Papers was not only that the disclosure would not "surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage" to the nation, but also that the Pentagon
Papers made a meaningful contribution to informed public discourse. Sup-
pose a newspaper accurately reports that American troops in Iraq recently
murdered twenty insurgents in cold blood. As a result of this publication,
60 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding the Secretary of State's revoca-
tion of a former CIA employee's passport for exposing the identities of covert CIA agents
around the world).
61 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
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insurgents quite predictably kidnap and murder twenty Americans. Could
the newspaper constitutionally be punished for disclosing the initial mas-
sacre? I would argue that it could not. Even if there were a clear and pre-
sent danger that the retaliation would follow, the information is simply
too important to the American people to punish its publication.
What this suggests is that to justify the criminal punishment of the
press for publishing classified information, the government must prove
that the publisher knew that (a) it was publishing classified information,
(b) the publication of which would result in likely, imminent, and serious
harm to the national security, and (c) the publication of which would not
meaningfully contribute to public debate. In practical effect, this has been
the law of the United States for more than half a century,62 although there
is no holding to this effect.
III. JOURNALISTS
In what circumstances may the government criminally punish a jour-
nalist for receiving or soliciting classified information from a government
employee for the purpose of publication? This is a novel question: in all
of American history, no journalist has ever been prosecuted under such a
theory.
A
The best place to begin is with ordinary criminal law principles. Such
principles do not trump the Constitution, but they provide a touchstone for
analysis. We can divide the most likely scenarios into three categories.
First, a journalist would violate ordinary criminal law principles if he
knowingly coerces, bribes, or defrauds a public employee, causing her to
62 Requirement (c) may seem novel, but it is embedded in both First Amendment prin-
ciple and First Amendment doctrine. Without some such requirement, no balance takes
place and the First Amendment side of the equation is simply ignored. Without (c), the test
would blithely assume that the harm of publication outweighs the value of publication. I
should emphasize that (c) is not a requirement in considering the constitutionality of regu-
lations of low value speech, content-neutral regulations, content-based regulations that are
not directed at particular ideas, items of information or viewpoints, or even regulations
directed at particular ideas, items of information, or viewpoints in special environments
(such as public employment, schools, and government subsidy programs). But when the
government attempts generally to restrict speech at the very core of the First Amendment,
requirement (c) plays an important role in the analysis. The best illustration of the rele-
vance of this requirement is in the evolution of the Court's doctrine in the area of speech
causing unlawful conduct, where the Court requires both express incitement and clear and
present danger. See Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in BOLLINGER &
STONE, ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 47, at 4-6 (Stone); Gerald Gunther, Learned
Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History,
27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754, 755 (1975); Schwartz, supra note 47, at 240-41.
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disclose classified information, provided that the employee could consti-
tutionally be punished for disclosing that information.
63
Second, a journalist would violate ordinary criminal law principles if
he knowingly encourages, incites, persuades, or solicits a public employee
to disclose classified information, provided that the employee could con-
stitutionally be punished for disclosing that information.'
Third, a journalist would violate ordinary criminal law principles if
he knowingly receives from a public employee (or, indeed, from any source)
classified information that could not lawfully be disclosed by a public
employee. 6
5
Thus, a journalist who obtains classified information by bribery, so-
licitation, or passive receipt may be guilty of a crime, unless the First
Amendment affords him protection. An ordinarily unlawful act is not
unlawful if it is protected by the First Amendment.
For example, the government can make it unlawful for any person to
obstruct the draft. An individual who physically blocks access to a selec-
tive service office can be punished for doing so. But an individual who
distributes leaflets criticizing the draft as immoral cannot constitutionally
be punished, even though his ideas might persuade some people to refuse
induction. 6 The criminal law principles are the same, but the pamphleteer
is protected by the First Amendment. Put simply, that the government can
make certain conduct unlawful does not mean that it can punish that con-
duct when it is protected by the First Amendment.
B
What does it mean to say that the conduct is "protected by the First
Amendment?" This question is more complicated than one might expect,
as there are many ways in which laws limit speech. First, a law may ex-
63 Getting the employee drunk would also fall into this category.
64 This category includes the crimes of conspiracy and attempt. On the crime of solici-
tation, see Model Penal Code § 5.02; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.1 (4th ed.
2002); Kent Greenawalt, supra note 47, at 113-19.
65 This is merely an application of the traditional crime of receiving stolen property.
There are subtleties in the meaning of "stolen" as applied to information, as distinct from
documents, but the basic principle of the traditional criminal law concept would clearly
apply to information as well as objects in situations like the one under consideration. It is a
defense to the crime that the recipient intends to return the property (or information) to its
lawful owner without in any way using it. Thus, a reporter who receives such a document
and immediately returns it to the government and never discloses it or its contents to any-
one else would not be guilty of a crime. On the crime of receipt of stolen property, see Model
Penal Code § 223.6; LAFAVE, supra note 64, at § 20.2.
66 In the early years of First Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld convic-
tions in such circumstances. See Schenck, 294 U.S. 47; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919). Over time, however, the Court embraced a much more speech-protective ap-
proach. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see generally Gunther, supra note
62; Schwartz, supra note 62; Frank Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger":
From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 41.
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pressly restrict the communication of particular points of view, ideas, or
items of information. For example, "No one may publicly criticize the
war" or "No one may publish classified information." Because such laws
may seriously distort the content of public debate and are often enacted for
constitutionally questionable reasons, they are presumptively unconstitu-
tional.67
Second, a law may expressly restrict communication, but not on the
basis of content. For example, "No one may distribute leaflets in a public
park" or "No one may erect a billboard near a public highway." Because
such laws regulate speech, but not on the basis of content, they are ana-
lyzed through a process of balancing, in which the court determines whether
the government interest outweighs the impact on speech.6"
Third, a law may restrict what is essentially non-communicative con-
duct, but in a way that has an incidental impact on speech. For example,
"No one may appear naked in public," as applied to an individual who
marches naked on Main Street to protest anti-obscenity laws, or "No one
may engage in wiretapping," as applied to a reporter who wiretaps a con-
gressman in the hope of hearing him accept a bribe. Because such laws
do not expressly restrict speech, they are presumptively constitutional. A
court will invalidate such laws only if the incidental effect on speech is
substantial and significantly outweighs the government's interest in en-
forcing the law.69
67 As we saw in Part I, in the public employment situation, such regulations may not be
presumptively unconstitutional. On content-based restrictions of speech, see Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 494-508 (1996); Paul Stephan, The First Amendment
and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regu-
lation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); Susan Williams,
Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991). As
noted, laws regulating low value speech on the basis of content involve a separate analysis
under the First Amendment.
6s See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
69 On "incidental" restrictions, see Michael Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental
Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996) (arguing that although "sound reasons can be ad-
vanced for taking direct burdens more seriously than incidental burdens," this does not
mean "that incidental burdens should never count as constitutional infringements"); Kagan,
supra note 67, at 494-508 (arguing that the distinction between direct and incidental re-
strictions in First Amendment analysis can be explained largely in terms of the concern
with avoiding possible improper governmental motivation); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amend-
ment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001) (arguing that "there is no such thing as
a free speech immunity based on the claim that someone wants to break an otherwise con-
stitutional law for First Amendment purposes"); Stone, supra note 68, at 114 (arguing that
although "[tihe general presumption is that incidental restrictions do not raise a question of
First Amendment review," courts will invalidate such restrictions if they have "a highly
disproportionate impact" or particular viewpoints or "significantly limit the opportunities
for free expression").
For illustrative decisions upholding laws having an incidental impact on speech, see
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (nude dancing); Arcara v. Cloud Books,
478 U.S. 697 (1986) (closing buildings used for prostitution, as applied to "adult" book-
store); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning). In a few deci-
sions, the Court has found incidental restrictions unconstitutional. See Boy Scouts of
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In considering whether a law violates the First Amendment, it is
necessary to determine which of these models applies. A law expressly
prohibiting the press from publishing classified information clearly regu-
lates content. Such a law would therefore be held to the highest degree of
First Amendment scrutiny.
But what kind of laws are We dealing with here? In the first instance,
we must look to the terms of the legislation. 70 If the government prose-
cutes a journalist for violating a law making it unlawful to encourage a
public employee to disclose classified information for the purpose of publi-
cation, the law would seem to fall squarely within the first category. It regu-
lates expression on the basis of content. Viewed in this light, the journal-
ist presumably would be protected by the First Amendment to the same
extent as the newspaper that publishes the information.
But it is not so simple. Suppose the journalist is prosecuted under a
general law prohibiting any person from soliciting the commission of a
felony. This statute would apply to solicitation to commit murder, rape,
arson, burglary, and fraud, as well as unlawfully to disclose classified infor-
mation. It is not expressly directed at communicative crimes.7' Hence,
this would seem to fall into the third category. Like laws prohibiting pub-
lic nudity and wiretapping, laws prohibiting solicitation to commit felo-
nies have only an incidental effect on expression. Such a law would be
presumptively constitutional.
How should we deal with such laws? The simplest way is for the gov-
ernment to prosecute those who bribe or solicit public employees to dis-
close classified information only under general laws prohibiting bribery
and solicitation, rather than under laws expressly targeting communica-
tive crimes. The laws currently on the books are all over the lot in this
respect. Because my interest in this Essay is in the First Amendment rather
than the statutory issues, I will assume that we are dealing with prosecu-
tions under general laws prohibiting bribery, solicitation, and the receipt
of stolen property, which makes the problem more challenging.
7 2
Let us assume, then, that a journalist is prosecuted for soliciting a pub-
lic employee to reveal classified national security information, a disclo-
sure for which the employee could constitutionally be punished. Let us as-
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (antidiscrimination law); Brown v. Socialist Workers
'74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (disclosure of campaign contributions);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (disclosure of NAACP membership lists).
70 The most comprehensive source on the relevant laws is Harold Edgar & Benno
Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 929 (1973).
11 Of course, solicitation, like bribery and conspiracy, involves the use of words. But,
at least in the context of private (as opposed to public) speech, such language is assumed to
have the quality of an "act" and does not itself raise serious First Amendment issues. See
Frederick Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line
School District, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 217.
72 For examples of the relevant laws, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. § 421 et
seq.
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sume further that the journalist is prosecuted under a general criminal
statute prohibiting any person from soliciting another to commit a crime.
As we have seen, if this law has only an incidental effect on speech, it
will likely be constitutional, even as applied to a journalist.
But why should this be so? The answer is, simply, that almost every
law can have an incidental effect on speech. A law against public nudity
(think of nude sunbathing) punishes public nudity by a person whose bare
bottom is intended as a form of political protest. A law against speeding
makes it more difficult for individuals to get to a demonstration or lecture
on time. A law against open fires in public prohibits flag-burning. A sales
tax reduces the amount of money you have to support your favorite po-
litical causes. A law against wiretapping makes it more difficult for re-
porters to gather news.73
The rationale of the incidental effects doctrine is largely one of prac-
ticality. Because almost every law can have some effect on speech, and
because individuals would readily claim they were engaged in speech if
that claim could make out a defense to a criminal charge, an approach
that required courts seriously to consider the incidental effects of laws on
speech-related activities in every case would be a judicial nightmare.
Moreover, in almost all of these instances the individual has many
other ways to achieve his goals. Instead of walking down Main Street
naked, the protester could carry a sign criticizing anti-obscenity laws. In-
stead of speeding to get to the lecture, the lecture-goer could have left on
time. Instead of burning a flag in public, the war opponent could shred
his flag and thus avoid the prohibition on open fires. In short, the actual
impact of most laws having incidental effects on free expression is usu-
ally slight.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has reasonably held that laws
having only an incidental effect on free expression are presumptively consti-
tutional and may be invalidated only in the very unusual situation in which
they have a substantial impact on free expression.74 This suggests that
general laws prohibiting bribery and solicitation are not unconstitutional
merely because they have an incidental effect on journalists who would
like to bribe or solicit public employees to disclose classified information
for the purpose of publication.
"3 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (no First Amendment press
exemption from breach of contract law); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)
(no First Amendment press exemption from newsroom searches); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (no First Amendment-based journalist-source privilege); Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (no First Amendment press exemption to NLRA).
14 For examples of decisions invalidating laws on this basis, see cases cited supra note
69.
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C
Once again, however, it is not so simple. The incidental impact of
these laws on the freedom of the press may be sufficiently serious to jus-
tify their invalidation. Certainly, some of the information that could be
disclosed unlawfully could be of considerable value to the public. But the
same would be true of unlawful journalistic wiretaps and burglaries. In
some circumstances, journalists would be better able to discover valuable
information if they could wiretap the offices of senators or burgle the homes
of corporate executives. But I doubt we are about to hold wiretapping, tres-
pass, and burglary laws unconstitutional as applied to journalists (though
such a claim is not absurd). Because the seriousness of the incidental impact
of laws against wiretapping and burglary is not much different from that
of the incidental impact of laws against bribery and solicitation, the inci-
dental impact of bribery and solicitation laws on freedom of the press would
not seem sufficiently substantial to justify invalidating those laws as ap-
plied to journalists.
But we are not dealing here with a conventional incidental impact situa-
tion, where the underlying crime is not inherently expressive. Speeding,
public nudity, wiretapping, burglary, making an open fire, and paying
taxes are not inherently expressive acts. If the First Amendment is impli-
cated in those situations, it is only because laws regulating those acts occa-
sionally have an effect on expressive behavior. The effect on speech, in
other words, is merely "incidental."
But in the public disclosure situation, the issue is more complex, be-
cause it involves two levels of conduct-the solicitation and the disclo-
sure. Although a general law prohibiting solicitation of a crime has only
an incidental effect on journalists who solicit public employees to dis-
close classified information, the crime solicited is itself a communicative
act, and it is that communication that causes the harm: a subtle but im-
portant distinction.
In the burglary situation, for example, it is the invasion of the home-
owner's property and privacy that causes the harm. It makes no difference
to the criminal law whether the burglar is interested in stealing money, jew-
els, or information. That a journalist commits burglary to gather news
rather than steal cash is irrelevant to the reason for prohibiting burglary.
But if a journalist is punished for soliciting classified information from a
public employee, the underlying act of disclosure causes harm precisely
because it involves expression. It is, indeed, the communication of the
information that the government seeks to prevent. Thus, unlike burglary,
bribery and solicitation are only quasi-incidental impact problems.75
75 All this may seem needlessly abstruse and complex, but this is sometimes the nature
of legal reasoning. General principles are useful to distinguish among different types of
cases, but the principles are almost always imprecise at the margins. There are gradations.
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These situations defy easy categorization either as laws that have only
an incidental effect on expression or as laws that regulate the content of
expression. It would be simplistic to pretend that these are routine cases
of mere incidental effect.7
6
Perhaps, most important, it is essential to recall how we came to the
conclusion that the government can constitutionally prohibit public em-
ployees from disclosing classified information to reporters for the pur-
pose of publication. As we saw in Part I, that issue poses a potentially
serious conflict between the First Amendment and the government's in-
terests in efficiency and security. We allow the government to prohibit its
employees from revealing information to the public not because the dan-
ger of disclosure necessarily outweighs the value of disclosure, but be-
cause public employees have consented to such a limitation of their rights
and because it is useful for the government to have clear and simple rules
for its employees. Although that approach may be justified for internal
management purposes, it substantially undervalues the potential impor-
tance of the disclosures to informed public debate.
As discussed in Part II, the government may not hold the press to the
same standard it applies to its employees. For the same reason that the stan-
dard for government employees does not govern the press, it also should
not govern the newsgathering activities of journalists.
In effect, newsgathering is an intermediate case. To resolve it, we
must explore two competing principles: the government's authority to regu-
late the speech of its employees and the press's authority to publish in-
formation of value to the public.
D
At this point, it is necessary to return to the three ways in which
journalists might obtain classified information from public employees:
(1) bribery, coercion, or fraud; (2) solicitation, persuasion, or incitement;
Sometimes it is best to ignore the gradations for the sake of simplicity, sometimes it is best
to take the gradations into account.
16 Another example of this sort of problem involves prosecutions of speakers under
breach of the peace statutes. Such laws ordinarily do not specify any particular content for
restriction. Rather, they prohibit any conduct that causes (or knowingly or intentionally
causes) a breach of the peace. It matters not under the statute whether the conduct is speech or
whether the speech carries any particular message. Viewed from this perspective, such laws
might be thought to have only an incidental effect on expression. In fact, however, the
Supreme Court has always treated such laws as content-based restrictions of speech when-
ever the conduct prosecuted is speech and the breach of the peace was caused by the con-
tent of the speech. Put differently, a law is analyzed as content-based, regardless of how it
is drafted, whenever its application turns on the communicative impact of speech. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I
(1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST 111 (1980) (a law is content-based when it turns in application on
"how people will react to what the speaker is saying"); Rubenfeld, supra note 69, at 777;
Stone, supra note 67, at 207-17.
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and (3) passive receipt. In the real world, of course, the lines blur, for the
relationships between journalists and their sources are subtle and complex.
Nonetheless, unless we embrace an all-or-nothing approach for the sake
of simplicity, distinctions must be made.
Situations (3) and (1) are the most straightforward. Situation (3) is
illustrated by the Pentagon Papers case, in which Daniel Ellsberg sent the
Papers unsolicited to Neil Sheehan of the New York Times. A similar situa-
tion arose in Bartnicki v. Vopper," in which Vopper, a radio commentator,
aired a tape recording of an unlawfully intercepted telephone conversa-
tion that an anonymous source had mailed to him. In both cases, the journal-
ists passively received the information, though both knew or should have
known that it had been obtained and disclosed to them unlawfully.
Under traditional criminal law principles, both Sheehan and Vopper
knowingly received "stolen" property. Nonetheless, because the informa-
tion in both cases involved matters of public concern, both Sheehan and
Vopper were protected by the First Amendment. As the Court explained
in Bartnicki, when a journalist receives information "from a source who
has obtained it unlawfully," the journalist may not be punished for the
receipt or publication of the information, "absent a need ... of the high-
est order."78
In rejecting the argument that the government can punish journalists
in order to deter those who unlawfully intercept conversations, the Court
in Bartnicki reasoned that if "the sanctions that presently attach to [the
unlawful acts] do not provide sufficient deterrence," then "perhaps those
sanctions should be made more severe," but "it would be quite remark-
able to hold" that a law-abiding journalist can constitutionally be punished
merely for receiving and publishing that information "in order to deter con-
duct by a non-law-abiding third party."7 9
Thus, in the passive receipt situation, neither the journalist nor the pub-
lisher can be criminally punished for receiving or possessing unlawfully
disclosed information, the publication of which could not constitutionally
be punished.
Situation (1) seems equally straightforward. The government has a le-
gitimate interest in expecting its employees to obey the law. For a jour-
77532 U.S. 514 (2001).7
1 Id. at 528.
79 1d. at 529-30. In Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the court
of appeals held that Bartnicki could be distinguished from a case in which a member of
Congress, McDermott, received an envelope containing a tape recording of an unlawfully
intercepted telephone conversation involving other members of Congress. After opening
the envelope and listening to the tape, McDermott shared the tape with reporters, who
proceeded to report on its contents. The Court distinguished Bartnicki on the ground that in
the instant case, McDermott knew the tape had been unlawfully made before he opened the
envelope and knew the identity of the person who provided him with the tape. In dissent,
Judge Sentelle, who clearly had the better of the argument, correctly explained that these
distinctions are without significance under the law. The D.C. Circuit has agreed to hear the
case en banc.
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nalist to bribe, coerce, or defraud a public employee to disclose classified
national security information unlawfully seems analogous to the wiretap-
ping and burglary examples. Like wiretapping and burglary, bribery, co-
ercion, and fraud are well-established crimes, far removed from the tradi-
tional processes of newsgathering. Although it might be useful for re-
porters to bribe and extort classified information from public employees,
and although such conduct would sometimes result in the disclosure of
valuable information, the government's legitimate interest in not having
its employees bribed, coerced, or defrauded seems sufficiently weighty to
justify the prohibition of such conduct.
Situation (2) is the trickiest. Like bribery, coercion, and fraud, so-
licitation is ordinarily unlawful. But that is also true of receiving stolen
property and, as we have seen, that an act is ordinarily unlawful does not
provide a conclusive answer in the First Amendment context. Although it
would be easy to envision a legal regime in which journalists would be pro-
hibited from encouraging public employees to reveal classified informa-
tion, such a regime would disregard the need to strike a proper balance
between government secrecy and an informed public.
Just as we grant the government "too much" authority to protect se-
crecy at its source, we must also grant the press "too much" authority to
probe that secrecy. To make it a crime for journalists to attempt to per-
suade public employees to disclose classified information that might con-
tribute to public debate would place too much weight on the secrecy side
of the scale. The standard that defines the government's power to punish
its employees for disclosing classified information ("potential harm to the
national security") was not designed to determine the balance between gov-
ernment secrecy and freedom of the press.
Indeed, building upon the Court's reasoning in Bartnicki, it would
seem that the appropriate government response to such solicitations is
not to prosecute journalists, but to increase the penalties for government
employees who violate the law. Moreover, an effort to apply the crime of
solicitation to the myriad interactions between journalists and their sources
would prove just as messy as an effort to regulate more precisely the re-
lationship between the government and its employees. Because it is often
difficult to define when a conversation passes the line between a discus-
sion of policy and a solicitation of a crime, the enforcement of solicita-
tion law in this setting would be uncertain, confusing, and treacherous.
The interjection of the government into the very heart of the journalist-
source relationship could have a serious chilling effect on journalist-source
exchanges.
One way to address these concerns (indeed, probably a constitutional
requirement), would be to limit the crime of solicitation in this context to
express incitement of unlawful conduct (e.g., "give me that classified
document, the disclosure of which is unlawful"). But as First Amendment
history and doctrine teach, even a requirement of express incitement is an
[Vol. I
HeinOnline  -- 1 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 212 2007
Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press
inadequate safeguard. The Court has held (at least in the context of pub-
lic speech) that even express incitement of unlawful conduct cannot con-
stitutionally be proscribed, unless it creates a likely and imminent danger
of serious harm.8"
The most sensible course is to hold that the government cannot con-
stitutionally punish journalists for encouraging public employees unlaw-
fully to disclose classified information, unless the journalist (a) expressly
incites the employee unlawfully to disclose classified information,
(b) knows that publication of this information would likely cause immi-
nent and serious harm to the national security, and (c) knows that publi-
cation of the information would not meaningfully contribute to public
debate.
Adhering to these guidelines would not render the government pow-
erless. As in Bartnicki, the government retains its ability to protect its le-
gitimate interests by punishing its employees for disclosing classified
information.
The United States has made it through more than two hundred years
without ever finding it necessary to prosecute a journalist for soliciting a
public employee to disclose confidential national security information.
This is not because such solicitations have never occurred, but because em-
ployees have usually complied with the law and, when they have not, the
press has either acted responsibly or the resulting harm has not been
thought sufficiently serious to justify an intrusion into the freedom of the
press."
E
At least one vexing question remains unresolved: who is a journal-
ist? Surely, reporters for the Washington Post or CNN qualify. But what
about a professor writing a book, a blogger, an editor of a school newspaper,
a lobbyist, or a spy? 2 The prospect of courts deciding as a matter of con-
80 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
S1 Another possibility is that public officials are loathe to prosecute the press because
they are reluctant to trigger widespread press criticism.
82 United States v. Rosen, No. 1:05CR225, 2006 WL 2345914 (E.D. Va., Aug. 9, 2006),
involved the prosecution of two lobbyists employed by the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee. The defendants allegedly obtained classified information from an employee of
the Department of Defense, which they then allegedly transmitted to members of the me-
dia, foreign policy analysts, and officials of a foreign government. The public employee
pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (g), 50 U.S.C. § 783 and 18 U.S.C. § 371.
The defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 793(g), which prohibits any per-
son from conspiring to transmit classified information to any person not entitled to receive
it. The district court rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that it violated the First Amendment.
The district court properly recognized that collecting information about foreign policy
"is at the core of the First Amendment's guarantees," that "the mere invocation of 'national
security' or 'government secrecy' does not foreclose a First Amendment inquiry," and that
the First Amendment provides less protection to public employees than to those who do
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stitutional interpretation who is a member of the "press" for First Amend-
ment purposes is daunting, at best.
Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Branzburg v.
Hayes,83 in which the Court declined to recognize a robust First Amend-
ment-based journalist-source privilege in part because recognition of such a
privilege would make it "necessary to define those categories of newsmen
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
pamphleteer... just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher."'
This sort of problem arises whenever anyone challenges a law be-
cause of its incidental effect on speech, which is one reason why the Court
has been reluctant to invalidate incidental impact laws. Despite this diffi-
culty, however, the Court has invalidated laws when their impact on free
expression was sufficiently severe. In NAACP v. Alabama,85 for example,
the Court held that Alabama could not constitutionally require the
NAACP to disclose its membership lists, explaining that the disclosure of
such information in Alabama at the height of the civil rights movement
might "induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade
others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs. ' '8 6 The
Court therefore held the law unconstitutional as applied to the NAACP,
opening the door to similar challenges to other laws by other individuals
and organizations.87
Similarly, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,8" the Court invalidated a
state antidiscrimination law as applied to the Boy Scouts. The Court held
that for the state to require the Boy Scouts to allow gay scoutmasters would
seriously impair the group's right of "expressive association."89 This de-
not "have access to the information by virtue of their official position." The district court
then erred, however, in holding that New York Times v. United States is limited to prior
restraints and, astonishingly, that lobbyists (and presumably even journalists) may consti-
tutionally be punished for knowingly disseminating information that is "potentially harm-
ful" to national security. See Rosen, 2006 WL 2345914, at *18, *19, *22, *26. The district
court "cited no precedents to support this conclusion, which flies in the face of at least fifty
years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The district court correctly treated 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(g) as a content-based restriction of potentially important speech, but, in effect, the
district court seemed to have simply ignored its own admonition that the First Amendment
treats nonpublic employees quite differently than public employees. In practical effect, the
court applied the standard it had carefully enunciated for the former to the latter. In this
respect, the decision seems clearly erroneous. Even if New York Times is limited to prior
restraints, the standard in this context at the very least must embody an element of "clear
and present danger."
83 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
8Id. at 704.
85 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
86 Id. at 463.
87 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (in-
validating the provisions of a state campaign reporting law as applied to the Socialist
Workers Party, "a minor political party that historically has been the object of harassment").
88 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
89 1d. at 644.
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cision, too, opened the door to challenges by other groups to similar laws
and regulations. Although the question "Who is the press?" is not identi-
cal to the questions "What organizations are like the NAACP?" or "What
organizations are like the Boy Scouts?," the nature of the inquiries is the
same.
There are three possible responses to the challenge of identifying who
is a "member of the press." First, rather than making the distinction at all,
we could conclude that the best course is to protect anyone who solicits
classified information from public employees. This approach would extend
First Amendment protection to some individuals who are not engaged in
First Amendment activity. The primary justification for this approach would
be that it avoids the need to decide who is a member of the "press." This is
not as peculiar as it might seem, for in this context, unlike most inciden-
tal restriction situations, a very high percentage of those who engage in
the activity of soliciting classified information from public employees are
likely to be journalists. Thus, the over-inclusiveness of this approach would
be relatively small.
Second, we could treat journalists as if they were not journalists.
That is, to avoid having to decide who is a member of the press, we could
hold that even mainstream members of the press can be punished for the
receipt or solicitation of classified information. In light of the analysis up
to this point, however, this approach seems too drastic. Ironically, it would
undermine the freedom of the press in order to avoid deciding who is
entitled to the freedom of the press.
Though ironic, this judgment would not be unprecedented-to the
contrary, the Court's reasoning in Branzburg was similar. But Branzburg
is distinguishable. In Branzburg, the Court concluded that a journalist-
source privilege was unnecessary. Whatever the merits of that conclusion,
the idea that the government can criminally punish reporters merely for
receiving or requesting classified information (even though the press has
a First Amendment right to publish that information) in order to avoid
deciding who is a journalist seems perverse.
Third, we could bite the bullet and decide, as a matter of First Amend-
ment interpretation, who is a member of the press. This endeavor might
not be quite as difficult as it seems, or at least as difficult as the Court
thought it would be at the time of Branzburg. In the years since that deci-
sion, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
form of journalist-source privilege statute,90 all of which require courts to
answer the question, "Who is a journalist?" Courts therefore have plenty
of experience with this issue. Of course, deciding this as a constitutional
matter is different from deciding it as a matter of statutory interpretation. 9'
90 See Stone, supra note 7, at 42 & n. 12.
91 See id. at 47-48. Similar issues arise with respect to the priest-penitent privilege.
Deciding who is protected by the priest-penitent privilege raises potentially thorny First
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The most straightforward definition would be a functional one-that is, a
member of the press for these purposes is a person who seeks the infor-
mation for the purpose of disseminating it to the public. This inquiry seems
both manageable and preferable to the alternatives. 92
But what about spies? What is to prevent an enemy spy from creat-
ing a blog, soliciting classified information from public employees, and
then insulating herself from criminal punishment by publishing the classi-
fied information on her blog, rather than transmitting it secretly to the
enemy? One answer, of course, is that in many instances this tactic would
significantly dilute the value of the spy's work. Espionage is most valu-
able when the nation spied upon does not know its secrets are not secret.
But this is a more fundamental issue, of a sort that arises throughout
First Amendment law. In deciding whether an individual may be punished
for her speech, it is necessary to focus on what she says and on the dan-
ger she creates, rather than on her motives. Is a person who criticizes the
war in Iraq attempting to weaken our national resolve in order to aid the
enemy, or is he participating constructively in public debate? Is he a trai-
tor or a patriot? The words he uses and the harm he causes may be pre-
cisely the same, regardless of his motive. In the evolution of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, we learned long ago that inquiries into subjective
intent and personal motivation are usually fruitless-and often danger-
ous-in the context of free speech. Even a traitor or a spy can meaning-
fully contribute to public debate, despite her bad motivations. 93
CONCLUSION
As this Essay suggests, it is not easy to reconcile the nation's impor-
tant interest in security with its equally important interest in preserving a
free and responsible press and an informed citizenry. My conclusions are
as follows:
Amendment concerns, but courts have dealt with them for centuries. See Ronald J. Co-
lombo, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 225 (1998). In that context, courts have usually taken a functional approach to the
inquiry. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990); Eck-
mann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
92 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811
F.2d 136, 143-45 (2d Cir. 1987).
93 On the other hand, there are many circumstances in which the law regulates indi-
viduals who are "agents" of a foreign power. The criminal punishment of such individuals
for soliciting classified information from public employees with the intent of harming the
United States might well be a permissible accommodation to the legitimate needs of the
nation. Certainly, the mere pretext of being a journalist need not insulate such individuals
from prosecution. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 27, at 407 ("Publication and espionage
should not be encompassed within a single prohibition, except in those rare instances where
the type of information at issue is extremely sensitive and of little value to informed public
debate.").
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First, the government constitutionally can discipline, discharge, and/or
criminally punish a public employee who knowingly discloses classified
information to a journalist for the purpose of publication if (a) the infor-
mation was not already in the public domain and (b) its disclosure has the
potential to harm the national security, unless the disclosure reveals unlaw-
ful government action and the employee has complied with reasonable
whistleblower procedures governing the disclosure of the information.
Second, the government constitutionally can punish the press for pub-
lishing classified information if the publisher knew that (a) it was publishing
classified information, (b) its publication would likely result in imminent
and serious harm to the national security, and (c) the publication would not
meaningfully contribute to public debate.
Third, the government constitutionally can punish a journalist for brib-
ing, coercing, or defrauding a public employee, causing her to disclose
classified information if the employee could constitutionally be punished
for disclosing the information.
Finally, the government constitutionally can punish a journalist for re-
ceiving or soliciting the disclosure of classified information from a public
employee if the journalist (a) expressly incited the employee to disclose
classified information, (b) knew that publication of the information would
result in likely, imminent, and serious harm to the national security, and
(c) knew that publication of the information would not meaningfully con-
tribute to public debate.
It is surely tempting to err on the side of government secrecy. But, as
the Declaration of Independence stated, a free society must rest on "the
consent of the governed." There is "no meaningful consent when those who
are governed do not know to what they are consenting." '
94 DAVID WISE & THOMAS B. Ross, THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 6 (1964).
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